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CAPTURE NUANCES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION
Lawrence G. Baxter

INTRODUCTION
In early May 2012, a select group of America’s most powerful
bankers was ushered into a meeting with the Governor most
responsible for bank regulation at the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (“Fed”).1 The bankers were there to express
their concerns about far-reaching proposed regulations designed to
promote financial stability and reduce their banking organizations’
exposure and potential for creating systemic risk. Such meetings
are ordinarily held in secret, but a notice and an agenda for this one
were leaked to the media, apparently angering that most secretive
of financial agencies.2
Few events could more perfectly illustrate the close relationship
between the Fed and the nation’s leading bankers.
One
commentator concluded in advance of the meeting that the purpose
of this “unusual pow-wow” was, in short, “to protect these banks’
cushy bottom lines, consequences to the overall economy be
damned.”3 This cynical conclusion added to a popular refrain that
the Fed has been “captured” by the industry it regulates.4
 Professor of the Practice of Law, Duke Law School. Developed from a
paper for the Wake Forest Law Review Spring Symposium, March 30, 2012,
entitled The Asymmetry of Administrative Law: The Lack of Public
Participation and the Public Interest. I am grateful to the participants in the
symposium for their helpful comments.
1. The Governor was Daniel Tarullo, who has the lead role on regulatory
policy among the Governors at the Fed.
2. See Donna Borak, FAQ: The Story Behind the Tarullo-CEOs Meeting on
Stress Tests, AM. BANKER (May 1, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues
/177_84/faq-tarullo-ceo-meeting-stress-tests-1048939-1.html.
3. Akshat Tewary, Big Banks Version of May Day, AM. BANKER (May 2,
2012),
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/Tarullo-meeting-Federal
-Reserve-counterparty-limit-1048954-1.html.
4. The claim has become very common in academic and popular literature.
It was perhaps most elegantly put by Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup,
ATLANTIC, May 2009, at 46, 48–50. For a more recent example, see, for
example, Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture in Financial Regulation: Can We
Channel it Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175
(2011); Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Who Captured the Fed?, N.Y. TIMES
ECON. BLOG (Mar. 29, 2012), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/whocaptured-the-fed/.
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Yet, reality seems to have been somewhat different. In the first
place, the bankers were permitted to express their views, but, under
a long-standing Fed rule, neither the Governor nor Fed staff was
permitted to respond. The Fed made it clear that no responses
specific to the bankers’ views would be given and that the bankers’
views “were just one perspective the Fed was considering.”5 The
bankers certainly had much to fear from the proposed rules—
enough to divert the time of their CEOs for half a day in efforts to
dilute their regulatory impact. Shortly before this meeting, the
Governor conducting the meeting made a public speech6 calling for
regulatory reform; a similar speech by the Governor of the Fed’s
British counterpart,7 the Bank of England, had already caused
anguish in the industry.8
Perhaps this whole affair could be dismissed as a charade, but if
it was, the charade was extraordinarily elaborate. It seems that
something much more complicated than capture is at work, even in
big bank regulation and even within the close relationship big
bankers undoubtedly have with their regulators.9

5. Zachary Goldfarb & Brady Dennis, Fed’s Tarullo Emerges as Banks’
Key Federal Foe on Regulating Risk, WASH. POST (May 18, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/feds-tarullo-emerges-as
-banks-key-federal-foe-on-regulating-risk/2012/05/18/gIQA9MhCYU_story.html;
see also Dan Fitzpatrick et al., Well, That Was Awkward . . . Bank Chiefs’
Regulatory Concerns Met With Official Silence, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230387760457738049261149889
0.html.
6. Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Fed. Reserve Sys. Bd. of Governors,
Regulatory Reform Since the Financial Crisis: Remarks to the Council on
Foreign
Relations
8
(May
2,
2012),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20120502a.pdf
(insisting on “rigorous implementation” of a wide suite of reforms); see also
Donna Borak, Fed’s Tarullo: Risk of ‘Too Big to Fail’ Rises Without Dodd-Frank,
AM. BANKER (May 2, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_85
/tarullo-dodd-frank-too-big-to-fail-1048965-1.html (reporting on similar views
expressed by Chairman Ben Bernanke the week before).
7. See Sir Mervyn King, The Today Lecture 2012, BBC TODAY PROGRAMME
(May
2,
2012),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_9718000
/9718062.stm.
8. See, e.g., Liam Halligan, Bankers’ Vitriol has Masked Sir Mervyn King’s
Uncomfortable Message, TELEGRAPH (May 5, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk
/finance/comment/liamhalligan/9248115/Bankers-vitriol-has-masked-Sir
-Mervyn-Kings-uncomfortable-message.html (describing the angry reaction of
bankers to King’s expression of regret that the Bank of England was not more
severe on banks in the run up to the Financial Crisis of 2008 (“Crisis”)). For the
United States situation, see, for example, Goldfarb & Dennis, supra note 5.
9. This is not to say that undue influence is never at work. Sometimes
laxity in supervision seems to leave one with no explanation other than either
regulatory incompetence or undue favoritism. See, e.g., Shahien Nasiripour, US
Regulator Under Fire for JPMorgan Oversight, FIN. TIMES (May 21, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fcc68db4-9f7c-11e1-8b84-00144feabdc0.html

W05_BAXTER.DOCX

2012]

(DO NOT DELETE)

CAPTURE NUANCES

10/27/2012 2:52 PM

539

The Wake Forest Law Review, in its Spring 2012 Symposium,
invited participants to consider, among many fascinating questions
relating to the problems of participation in the administrative
process, whether “the domination of industry interests necessarily
results in agency capture?” This Article focuses specifically on the
capture question as it might apply to financial regulation, and in
this context the question is quite problematic. It will be suggested
that in the world of financial regulation, particularly “bank”
regulation, the concept of “capture” loses much of its analytic power
for two principal reasons. First, no single regulator is involved, and
those that are engaged have different, very important missions.
Their respective susceptibility to capture ought inevitably to vary.
Capture of all of them by any one group of financial interests,
however large, seems implausible. Second, the quasi-public role of
banks—particularly, but not only, large banks—renders the
supposed government/private enterprise distinction, upon which the
notion of “capture” depends,10 quite enigmatic and volatile. As a
result, exactly who can capture whom, and exactly what is to be
captured, is very hard, and perhaps sometimes simply impossible, to
discern.11
If these are accurate descriptions of the regulatory
environment, then “capture” is a very unsteady concept for assessing
whether the public interest is being served in financial regulation.
“Public participation” also becomes difficult to apply as a normative
criterion because there are many “public participations” and many
forums of participation.
There are two traditional normative approaches to combating
perceived capture by one interest group of the regulatory regime for
all the groups. The first, a “pro-market” approach, is to avoid or
reduce agency involvement as much as possible, on the expectation
that regulatory agencies can be—and, in the view of many, are
inevitably going to be—captured by the most powerful industry
interests. Such an approach would increase reliance on market
discipline on the assumption that markets are, or could be, less

#axzz1vVZLSSwJ (discussing the failure by JPMorgan’s primary regulator, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), to catch the buildup of risk
that led to a massive trading loss on the part of the bank, and quoting one
commentator as saying that “[t]here’s some sort of cultural and ideological
capture at the OCC”).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 60–68.
11. Capture theory is simplistic in other respects as well. For example, it is
unable to differentiate between excessive industry influence, on the one hand,
and less conspiratorial explanations of agency performance such as
incompetence or mere lack of resources. An additional embarrassment for
capture theorists is the role played by many obviously independent regulators
who have earned public recognition for standing up to both industry and other
regulators. See infra text accompanying notes 31–43, 131.
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susceptible to discreet industry dominance. The second, a “proregulatory” approach, would increase rulemaking safeguards (such
as transparency, independence from industry, and rigorous isolation
of regulatory decisions), which are designed to prevent, or at least
minimize, the opportunity for improper influence by particular
groups.12 This Article builds on a view of the process of agency
policy formation to conclude that avoidance of “capture” (or undue
influence by one set of interests) should properly embrace both
approaches.13
In place of an either/or approach, we should focus on attempting
to strike the right balance of market discipline and agency
processes. In order to understand the overall process, Part I of this
Article briefly characterizes financial policy formation as the
outcome of contests between all the participants involved, all acting
in their own interests as “agents” in a complex adaptive system.
Part II describes the multiple-part system of regulatory agencies
involved in the formation of financial regulatory policy in the United
States, a system that inevitably introduces a diversity of agency
views and tends to inhibit the formation of a single regulatory view
that might be captured. Part III considers the “quasi-public" role
played by banks, even small banks, that is usually overlooked in
debates about agency capture, yet which greatly complicates any
assessment of the role banks play in relation to government. Put
quite simply, they are not merely “private” market actors, and it is
therefore often appropriate for them to engage very closely with
government, sometimes even at the cost of appearing to “be in bed
with their regulators.” Part IV of the Article considers the ways in
which undue sectoral influence might be averted in the process of
policy formation and how a balanced overall result—one that takes

12. For sophisticated reviews of the various ways in which “capture” has
been used, sometimes to further ideological ends, see, for example, Daniel
Carpenter & David Moss, Introduction to PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL
INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter &
David Moss eds.) (forthcoming 2012); Stefano Pagliari, Introduction to THE
MAKING OF GOOD FINANCIAL REGULATION: TOWARD A POLICY RESPONSE TO
REGULATORY CAPTURE (Stefano Pagliari ed., 2012), available at
http://www.icffr.org/assets/pdfs/June-2012/ICFR-Regulatory-Capture-Book-25
-June---The-Making-.aspx; Jørgen Grønnegaard Christensen, Public Interest
Regulation Reconsidered: From Capture to Credible Commitment (Jerusalem
Papers in Regulation & Governance, Working Paper No. 19, Jul. 2010),
available at http://regulation.upf.edu/dublin-10-papers/1J1.pdf (reviewing the
logic of the three major theories underlying public interest regulation, namely
public interest theory, capture theory, and credible commitment).
13. Cf. Christensen, supra note 12 (advocating an approach to the
formulation of public policy that takes the notion of “public interest” seriously
but does not assume an objective “public interest”; rather, the important
element in the process is to ensure a “wide inclusion of both regulated and third
party interests”).
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into consideration the interests of all the stakeholders affected—
might realistically be promoted. These recommendations are not
novel, but they retain their merit at a time when debates about
financial regulatory policy have tended to become highly adversarial
and, in the end, unconstructive.
I. PUBLIC POLICY FORMATION IN THE
CONTESTED ARENA
As a working definition, “capture” is defined here as “the
heavily disproportionate influence by one of the interest groups
covered by a regulatory framework to the improper disadvantage, or
exclusion, of other groups also intended to be embraced, restricted or
protected by the regulatory regime.”14 Using this definition, if ever
there were an apparent example of the appearance of massive
industry capture of the government, the world of financial
regulation would be it. Yet, a complexity view of this world suggests
an environment rather more nuanced than this “winners and losers”
model invoked by traditional capture analysis.
The financial market provides a prime example of a complex
adaptive system.15 Global and domestic financial systems consist of
a wide diversity of participants (or “agents”) all interacting with
each other in sophisticated networks, in large part without central
direction, and evolving in a constant state of flux. It is equally
applicable to the process of financial policy formation, in which
14. Of course this definition begs many questions, such as what is meant by
“disproportionate” or “improper.” This Article, however, proceeds upon the
assumption that answers to these questions are inherently contested and very
seldom clearly determined by the legislature—which is precisely why we have
processes for reaching the outcome, delegation of details to the agencies, and
the anticipation of ever-changing circumstances in the financial markets, which
anticipation is embodied in the discretionary nature of the rulemaking and
adjudication powers delegated to the regulators.
15. Complex adaptive systems share a number of common characteristics.
They are not merely complicated; instead they are complex in the sense that
they comprise a diverse variety of “agents” or actors all interacting with each
other in a constantly evolving ecology that might or might not endure over time.
Those that do endure have the quality of resilience or robustness, but, even if
robust, a complex adaptive system also has the danger of developing selfcriticality or the potential for sudden collapse. To be properly understood, the
interactions of all the agents—in the case of financial markets, industry
players, consumers, supporting utilities, and the regulators—must be taken
into account through the application of a variety of disciplines ranging from
game theory to network science. For an introductory review of how complexity
theory is being applied to the understanding of financial systems, see, for
example, Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability
in an Era of Large Banks and Complex Finance, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 765
(2011–12) (Part III and the references cited therein). For a general introduction
to the subject, see generally MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR
(2009).
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regulators (even legislatures and courts) are themselves agents
interacting not only with the agents of industry, consumers, and
other organizations but also with each other.16 In effect, public
policy is developed in an arena of contest—through a process
Professor Thomas McGarity has aptly described as a “blood sport.”17
In this view, finance comprises a complex ecology. The policies
generated by legislatures and agents are shaped by the contesting
forces of many diverse players. No matter how hard and firm the
rules erected to structure and control financial markets might be,
the policies shaping and implementing these rules are never static.
Instead they are dynamic, buffeted by and reacting in their
interpretation to the actions and reactions of the agents impacted by
them. This is not to say that rules and agency decisions are
ineffective; on the contrary, they are forces that themselves
influence, with varying degrees of specificity (depending on how
clear and simple they are), the actions of participants in the market.
But they compete with many other forces to produce outcomes.
An important conclusion to be drawn from this “complexity”
view of financial regulation is that the policies resulting from this
dynamic interaction are not linear. They are themselves in flux and
adaptive, for good or ill, and they are continually being shaped by a
variety of forces. In a suitably diverse and resilient financial
ecology, improper influence by any one set of agents or interest
groups would be ephemeral and perpetually subject to the dynamic
forces of market competition, counterefforts by other interest
groups, and contestation among agencies with differing interests
and views of financial policy.18
This way of looking at the process does not mean that the
danger of improper influence, or ultimate “capture,” is not real.

16. See Mark A. Chinen, Governing Complexity, in GLOBALIZATION AND
GOVERNANCE 55, 59–64 (Laurence Boulle ed. 2011) (discussing the application
of complexity science to understanding public policy, and citing the leading
works in the field); Robert Geyer, Beyond the Third Way: The Science of
Complexity and the Politics of Choice, 5 BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L REL. 237, 243
(2003) (outlining the characteristics of complex systems, including the rich
interactions within them). See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.
GLOBAL SCIENCE FORUM, REPORT ON APPLICATIONS OF COMPLEXITY SCIENCE FOR
PUBLIC RELATIONS: NEW TOOLS FOR FINDING UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES AND
UNREALIZED OPPORTUNITIES (2009).
17. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as a Blood
Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671 (2012)
(describing how extreme partisanship has attracted high spending on the part
of the players/stakeholders and has attracted new stakeholders to the process).
I would only differ from Professor McGarity in arguing that this contestation is
inherent to the process and has only become more visible and more distasteful
now because popular political division seems to have deepened dramatically.
18. In the end, the objective should be to prevent the field of contest from
becoming so tilted that a meaningful contest cannot take place.
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Indeed, it is likely to be the natural ambition of all the agents in the
process. But such a view helps us focus on the elements important
to the continuing resilience, market efficiency, and democratic
health of the financial system as a whole.
II. THE REGULATORY POLICY MATRIX
A major factor complicating capture analysis, and perhaps even
mitigating the dangers of capture in financial regulation, is the oftcriticized, highly matrixed financial regulatory structure.19 America
still has a vibrant “dual banking” system. Although the biggest
banks tend to be federally chartered national banks, many
thousands of banks are still chartered by state banking agencies.
The biggest differences in the relative powers of national and statechartered banks have been considerably reduced over recent
decades, but banks do still have a real choice, and they still make
it.20 The ability to make the choice, not only between federal and
state charters but, until recently, between different types of federal
charters,21 has given rise to the fear, empirically unsubstantiated,22
19. See Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the
United States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L.
REV. 1, 5–6 (2005) (describing and criticizing the complicated structure of
financial regulation in the United States, including the involvement of well over
115 federal and state regulators). Numerous commentators and assessments
have long blamed the multiplicity of regulators for the failure to anticipate the
problems at specific institutions and the escalation of risk leading to the Crisis.
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-61, FINANCIAL
REGULATION: INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY
STRUCTURE, at abstract (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items
/d0561.pdf (describing numerous instances of disagreements among the
financial regulatory agencies and attributing to this disagreement a failure to
apply “consistent, comprehensive regulation”).
20. See, e.g., Barbara Rehm, Natural Selection? Questioning the Future of
The
Dual
Banking
System,
AM.
BANKER
(Dec.
1,
2011),
http://www.americanbanker.com/magazine/121_12/dual-system-future-1044216
-1.html (discussing the evolution of the dual banking system in light of recent
regulatory reforms).
21. A financial institution wishing to engage in banking can choose either a
bank charter or a savings and loan charter (“thrift” charter). While the former
is the more traditional form, a thrift charter has offered more attractive powers
in some circumstances. Banks are chartered by either a state banking
commissioner or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”). Until
recently, savings and loan associations were chartered by either a state
regulator or the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”), a separate agency within
the United States Treasury. The Dodd-Frank Act eliminated the OTS and
transferred the federal chartering powers for thrifts to the OCC. Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, §§ 311–313, 12 U.S.C. §§
5411–5413 (Supp. IV 2010).
22. See Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Requiem for a Regulator: The
Office of Thrift Supervision’s Performance During the Financial Crisis, 89 N.C.
L. REV. 1777, 1796–1811 (2011) (evaluating the impact of competition for
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of a “race to the bottom,” in terms of which states and the federal
government compete for charters by granting wider powers to banks
or relaxing regulatory standards. So this dual system itself can
affect the relevance of “capture.” On the one hand, the dual system
could increase the possibility of capture to the extent that statechartered banks might be able to exercise influence over relatively
weak state regulators, or national banks might be able to
concentrate their influence on one federal regulator. On the other,
the differing constituencies and varying views of state and national
chartering and supervisory authorities introduce a diversity of
interests that would make it more difficult for any one sector of the
industry to ensure that its preferences would dominate the
regulator.
The dual system has also given rise to conflicting interests that
help provide balance in the contest for influence. Most small banks,
for example, are state chartered, and their interests are represented
vigorously through various organizations, including the Conference
of State Bank Supervisors23 and the Independent Community
Bankers of America.24 In recent years, the interests of these
organizations have clearly been at odds with those representing the
very big banks. These divergent interests have made a difference in
both legislative and regulatory outcomes25 and still function as

charters and finding no significant differences in returns between institutions
that converted federal thrift charters to bank charters and vice versa). The
OTS was heavily criticized for being a weak regulator, perhaps even captured
by the industry it regulated (savings and loan associations). A number of the
largest financial institutions (“FIs”) that collapsed or had to be bailed out
during the Crisis, including American International Group (“AIG”), IndyMac,
and Washington Mutual, were under OTS supervision. Among the criticisms
leveled at the OTS was the suggestion that lax OTS rules encouraged FIs to flip
their charters in order to avoid more rigorous regulation and to gain the favor of
a “captured” regulator. Yet, as the authors show, the evidence that charter flips
actually did produce advantages is mixed at best. Id.
23. See generally CONF. ST. BANK SUPERVISORS, http://www.csbs.org/Pages
/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 4, 2012).
24. See generally INDEP. COMMUNITY BANKERS AM., http://www.icba.org/
(last visited Sept. 4, 2012).
25. For example, smaller banks and their holding companies have been
able to secure more lenient treatment in the case of certain kinds of regulation,
such as slightly broader investment powers (trust-preferred securities), more
lenient capital compliance requirements, enhanced systemic risk supervision
(holding companies with consolidated assets of less than $50 billion), and
oversight by the Consumer Financial Protection Board (“CFPB”) (banks with
assets of less than $10 billion are not subject to direct oversight by the CFPB).
In light of the number of other new regulations introduced by Dodd-Frank,
whether these exemptions confer net benefits is the subject of fierce debate.
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criteria for choosing a state charter over a federal one, or vice
versa.26
Of course the sheer scale of modern banks and the fact that big
banks are now regulated almost exclusively at the federal level27
suggest that concerns with capture and deficiencies in public
participation ought to focus on federal financial regulation. Yet
even at the federal level there is a complicated regulatory
framework that can, and often does, work to prevent, or at least
make it very difficult for, the strongest financial sectors to exercise
undue influence. The Fed has emerged as the central regulator for
large financial conglomerates, including foreign financial
organizations operating in the United States.28 At the same time,
the primary regulator for national banks continues to be the
Comptroller of the Currency,29 whose Office (the “OCC”) is located
within the Treasury Department but whose head is separately
appointed by the President.30 And the interests of the Treasury
26. See Esther L. George, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve
Bank of Kan. City, Perspectives on 150 Years of Dual Banking, Speech to the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors (May 22, 2012) available at
http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/speeches/2012-george-ga-csbs-05-22.pdf
(explaining the resilience of the dual banking system and why it still offers real
choices).
27. Although seventy-four percent of banking charters (including thrifts)
are issued at the state level, see CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, 2011
ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2012), available at http://www.csbs.org/news/presentations
/annualreports/Documents/2011FINALCSBSANNUALREPORT.pdf, nationally
chartered banks (including thrifts) own seventy-six percent of all commercial
banking assets in the United States. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, at cover insert (2012), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/annual-reports
/2011AnnualReport.pdf.
28. The Fed has long had direct supervisory authority over state-chartered
banks that became members of the Federal Reserve System; national banks
were directly regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency and continue to be
so regulated. See infra. Since the passage of the Bank Holding Company Act in
1956, the Fed has also had significant supervisory jurisdiction over the holding
companies that might own one or more national banks. Two major elements of
the Dodd-Frank Act have now ensured that the Fed is positioned to become the
primary regulator for banking conglomerates. The first is the “enhanced”
supervisory powers conferred on the Fed, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act §§ 115 & 165, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5325 & 5365 (Supp. IV
2010), over bank holding companies with consolidated assets of $50 billion or
greater, and non-bank financial organizations designated as systemically
important financial institutions (“SIFIs”) by the Financial Stability Oversight
Council in terms of section 113. The second is the Collins Amendment to the
Dodd-Frank Act in section 171, in terms of which the Fed must apply very
important capital and leverage ratios across the holding company structure
(prior to Dodd-Frank such ratios were applied only to the depository institution
subsidiaries of these conglomerates).
29. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
30. Id. § 2.
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Department and the Fed, while often seemingly unified, are in
reality often at odds.31 Indeed, the OCC and the larger Treasury
Department itself are not always in mutual agreement on matters of
financial policy and regulation.32
Even more importantly, there is a third major regulator, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), with regulatory
authority over almost all financial conglomerates that have banks or
savings associations within their corporate combinations—and this
means all banks of significance in the United States.33 The FDIC
manages the deposit insurance fund and is the receiver or liquidator
for all insured depository institutions (banks and savings
associations)34 and potentially all systemically important financial
institutions, even if they are not banks.35 These roles often place the
FDIC in stark opposition to the OCC or the Fed, and sometimes
both. The FDIC has an interest in preventing reckless bank
activities that might endanger depositors and the deposit insurance
fund, whereas the OCC, for example, has an interest in promoting
and expanding the national banking industry, just as the state
regulators have an interest in promoting the state banking system.
It is therefore not surprising that the OCC and the Fed, on the one
hand, and the FDIC on the other, have clashed over what bank

31. For one of many examples, see, for example, Donna Borak, OCC Joins
Other Agencies in Fight Against Debit Interchange Limit, AM. BANKER (Mar. 8,
2011), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_46/occ-agencies-fight-debit
-interchg-limit-1034149-1.html (describing strong differences of opinion
between the Fed, on the one hand, and the OCC, FDIC, and even the Fed
Chairman, on the other, regarding the setting of debit card interchange fees).
32. See, e.g., Letter from George W. Madison, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of the
Treasury, to John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the
Comptroller
of
the
Currency
(June
27,
2011),
available
at
http://cdn.americanbanker.com/media/pdfs/TreasuryOCC_062811.pdf
(criticizing the OCC’s proposed rulemaking relating to federal preemption of
state consumer protection standards); see also Victoria McGrane, Treasury
Assails OCC on Draft Rule, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2011), http://online.wsj.com
/article/SB10001424052702303627104576414191405604726.html.
33. The FDIC insures over 7000 depository institutions. See FDIC, 2011
ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2012), available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report
/2011annualreport/AR11final.pdf. FDIC insurance covers almost eighty percent
of all insured deposits in the United States. Id. at 130.
34. Credit unions are separately insured by the National Credit Union
Share Insurance Fund, and if they fail, the National Credit Union
Administration acts as receiver. While not insignificant in national financial
policy, credit unions are not covered in the discussion in this article.
35. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §
204(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5384(b) (Supp. IV 2010) (noting that the FDIC is appointed
as receiver for “covered financial companies” placed into liquidation upon a
determination that their impending failure could pose a significant threat to the
financial stability of the United States).
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activities and investments should be permitted or prohibited.36
Similarly, the Fed and the FDIC have clashed over policy governing
bank capital requirements because the Fed and the FDIC are not
always in agreement over where the balance between safety and
soundness, on the one hand, and credit expansion, on the other,
should be struck.37
A new regulatory perspective has also been introduced as a
result of the addition of the new Consumer Financial Protection
Board (“CFPB”),38 which adds a consumer protection focus to the
investor protection and financial exchanges regulation traditionally
provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)39 and
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).40 Together
these agencies provide yet another center of divergent interest on
matters of financial regulatory policy, and they, too, can and do
differ, sometimes vehemently, on regulatory policy.41 They are
36. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Sheila Bair’s Bank Shot, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 9,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/magazine/sheila-bairs-exit
-interview.html (describing numerous disagreements between the FDIC under
the chairmanship of Sheila Bair and the OCC and other agencies). One wellpublicized example was the disagreement between the FDIC and the Fed over
whether large banks should be permitted to move their derivatives businesses
into their insured depository institutions in order to reduce the amount of
collateral they would need to post. See Bob Ivry et al., BofA Said to Split
Regulators over Moving Merrill Derivatives to Bank Unit, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18,
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-18/bofa-said-to-split-regulators
-over-moving-merrill-derivatives-to-bank-unit.html.
37. As the Crisis developed, the FDIC vigorously disagreed with the Fed
over whether to permit banks to continue using trust-preferred securities as a
means of raising capital. In the end, the FDIC’s concerns were proven well
founded. See, e.g., Greg Gordon & Kevin G. Hall, How the Fed Let Small Banks
Take on Too Much Debt, Then Fail, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Dec. 22, 2010),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/12/22/v-print/105708/fed-could-have-saved
-many-smaller.html.
38. The CFPB (legislatively designated the “Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection”) was created by section 1011 of the Dodd-Frank Act. See CONSUMER
FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ (last visited Sept. 4,
2012).
39. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 4, 48 Stat.
881 (1934); see U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov
/index.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2012).
40. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93463, § 201, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974); see U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/index.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2012).
41. See, e.g., Kevin Wack, Closed-Door Battle over Volcker Spills into Public
View, AM. BANKER (May 21, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com
/issues/177_98/Gary-Gensler-Mary-Schapiro-Volcker-Rule-JPMorgan-Chase1049494-1.html (describing the deep differences—a “long running, closed-door
battle”—between the CFTC, on the one hand, and the Fed, OCC, FDIC, and
SEC, on the other, over how vigorously to enforce the Volcker Rule, which
prohibits proprietary trading by banks). See generally Eugene F. Maloney,
Banks and the SEC: A Regulatory Mismatch, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
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focused on market conduct and, as such, perform something of the
umpireal role that would make regulatory capture a particularly
acute concern. The CFPB has been fiercely opposed by the banking
industry and other credit providers42 because some in the industry
have feared the additional regulatory burdens the new agency would
bring. In reality, however, it might be less the burden of new
regulation that bankers fear and more the different center of
interest and specialized enforcement focus that the new agency will
represent.43
Finally, the international layer should not be overlooked. The
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”),44 the Financial
Stability Board (“FSB”),45 and to some extent even the International
Monetary Fund (“IMF”),46 all play a substantial role in influencing

443, 454–58 (2006) (discussing numerous examples of the differences in
philosophical outlook between the banking agencies and the SEC).
42. For a collection of articles reporting on the partisan positions for and
against the CFPB, see Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (C.F.P.B.),
N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c
/consumer_financial_protection_bureau/index.html (last updated Aug. 10,
2012).
43. Apart from a new standard by which to assess the acceptability of
consumer financial services (whether a product or service is “unfair, deceptive
or abusive” standard, as defined in section 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act), most of
the powers possessed by the CFPB were already within the scope of authority of
other financial regulators and were simply transferred from them. It is the
reinvigorated focus on these powers that is probably one of the biggest reasons
for resistance to them.
44. The BCBS was created in 1974 as a committee of the Bank for
International Settlements. It has no formal legal powers, but its influence has
become central to modern banking, and its latest iteration of minimum bank
capital and liquidity standards—Basel III—is one of the most important points
of reference for modern financial regulation. See Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm
(last visited Sept. 4, 2012); see also infra note 48.
45. The FSB was created by the G20 nations in 2009 as a response to the
Crisis. It was upgraded from an earlier, rather anemic committee (the
Financial Stability Forum) that had been formed in the wake of the Asian
Financial Crisis of the late 1990s. The FSB now plays a major role in shaping
regulatory thinking on the so-called Global-Systemically Important Financial
Banks and Financial Institutions (“G-SIFIs”), whose thinking contributes to
and influences the way in which domestic regulators approach important
elements of financial regulation. On the FSB, see History, FIN. STABILITY
BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history.htm (last visited
Sept. 4, 2012); see also infra note 48.
46. The IMF and World Bank jointly conduct a Financial Sector
Assessment Program (“FSAP”) in terms of which the quality of financial
regulation applied by member countries is reviewed as a peer assessment
process. See IMF, FACTSHEET: THE FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
(FSAP) 1–2 (2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts
/pdf/fsap.pdf. See generally CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULEMAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 157 (2011).
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domestic regulatory policy.
Basel III47 and the new GlobalSystemically Important Financial Banks and Financial Institutions
(“G-SIFIs”) surcharges,48 emanating from the BCBS and the FSB,
provide important examples of policy pressure that has helped
shape, and has been shaped by, the views of the Fed and Treasury
Department via a mechanism that has come to be described in
international relations theory as a transnational regulatory network
(“TRN”).49
This hodgepodge of regulatory structures is often criticized as
being irrational and incomprehensive.50 There are certainly huge
elements of the financial industry, including hedge funds and
mutual funds among many others, that are tightly connected to the
banking industry but are not fully covered by regulation in ways
that would ensure against “leakage” and regulatory arbitrage.51
However, in the opinion of this author, the call for a single federal
banking regulator has so far been resisted for good reason. A
divergence of regulatory opinion is probably far more valuable as an
assurance against major regulatory mistakes than whatever
benefits the real or imagined coherence of a single regulator might
bring. And this divergence of expressions of the public interest
through the mechanism of multiple, powerful regulators might well
constitute an important safeguard against excessive industry
influence.
III. GOVERNMENT & FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
A COMPLICATED EMBRACE
The Financial Crisis of 2008 (“Crisis”) certainly seems to have
produced many potential illustrations of capture. The phone logs of
the then-President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Timothy
47. See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A
GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING
SYSTEMS (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
48. See generally FIN. STABILITY BD., POLICY MEASURES TO ADDRESS
SYSTEMATICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2011), available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf.
49. The literature on TRNs is now extant. For a critical assessment, see
generally Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and
Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113 (2009).
50. See, e.g., supra note 19.
51. Perhaps most important is the vast ecology of financial institutions
(“FIs”) that comprise the so-called “shadow banking industry.” These are FIs
such as hedge funds, broker-dealers, mutual funds, insurance companies (such
as AIG), and other non-insured depository institutions that complement and
interconnect with the traditional banking and investment industry. See
generally ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., SHADOW BANKING (2010); Steven L. Schwarz,
Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619 (2012); Erik F.
Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and its Legal Origins (Jan. 24, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990816.
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Geithner, indicate that the captains of the financial industry talked
regularly with him, on some occasions many times in a single day.52
Subsequent records, disclosed under sanction of Congress or through
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) lawsuits, indicate that the
Federal Reserve System had itself arranged for huge, secret loans or
other forms of emergency funding to be made available to domestic
and foreign financial institutions on such terms that serious
questions of political accountability were and continue to be raised.53
Recently, controversy has raged around whether it is appropriate
that prominent bankers, such as Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase
& Co., should be members of the Federal Reserve banks that are
supposed to regulate their institutions.54
Since that time, and even long before, the revolving door
between government and the financial industry has spun around at
a breathtaking pace.55
The volume of comment by industry
52. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 4, at 184–85 (citing examples); see also
infra note 99 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Bob Ivry et al., Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks Undisclosed
$13B, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11
-28/secret-fed-loans-undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in
-income.html (describing massive, low-interest loans extended by the Fed to
domestic and foreign banking organizations to help them recover from the
Crisis. These loans were secret until the Fed was forced to disclose them as a
result of court orders).
54. Local bankers have traditionally played a major role in the governance
of the twelve district Federal Reserve banks, and to this day their nominees are
Class A directors of the district banks. Class A directors constitute one-third of
the total board. When JPMorgan Chase, one of the largest U.S. banks, suffered
severe trading losses, numerous commentators and politicians were prompted
to demand the resignation of the bank’s chief executive officer, Jamie Dimon,
from his position as a Class A director of the New York Federal Reserve Bank.
See Donna Borak, Dimon’s Role on N.Y. Fed Board Sparks Fierce Debate, AM.
BANKER (May 18, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_97/Jamie
-Dimon-Chase-Fed-New-York-board-director-resign-1049463-1.html; Directors
of
Federal
Reserve
Banks
and
Branches,
FED.
RES.
BOARD,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/directors/ (last updated July 25,
2012); see also Peter S. Goodwin, Elizabeth Warren is Right: Jamie Dimon
Needs to Resign from the N.Y. Fed, HUFFINGTON POST (May 14, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-s-goodman/elizabeth-warren-jamie
-dimon_b_1515220.html? (reporting on calls for, and directly calling on, Dimon’s
resignation from his NY Fed position); Simon Johnson, Dimon and the Fed’s
Legitimacy,
N.Y.
TIMES
ECON.
BLOG
(May
24,
2012),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/dimon-and-the-feds-legitimacy/;
Simon Johnson, Jamie Dimon and the Fall of Nations, N.Y. TIMES ECON. BLOG
(May 31, 2012), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/jamie-dimon-and
-the-fall-of-nations/; Simon Johnson, Jamie Dimon Should Resign from the
Board of the New York Fed, BASELINE SCENARIO (May 21, 2012),
http://baselinescenario.com/2012/05/21/jamie-dimon-should-resign-from-the
-board-of-the-new-york-fed/.
55. See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL
STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 92–104 (2010) (citing
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representatives during the rulemaking process implementing the
Dodd-Frank Act56—a massive legislative reform designed to address
the causes of the Crisis—has been disproportionate to the
substantive input by other stakeholders in the process.57 Finally,
the raw political power of firms and agencies participating in the
financial industry, from individual banks and their industry
representatives to the giant government-sponsored enterprises
(“GSEs”) Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, seems evident from their
vast collective spending on lobbying, both in Congress and to the
financial regulatory agencies.58
With all these issues and events, the appearance of undue
industry influence certainly seems great. Yet, there are also many
benign explanations for a good deal of industry influence peddling.
The financial industry, perhaps unlike any other (with the possible
exception of public utilities), possesses some fundamentally distinct
characteristics that make its level of influence both inevitable and,
to a certain degree, essential. It is not just that the financial
business is exceptionally complicated; this can be said of many other
businesses too, such as pharmaceutical development and
manufacture and deep sea oil drilling. It is because, since the
founding of the Republic, we have maintained an assumption that
banking is or should be a “private” activity,59 when in fact it has
many examples of what the authors call “The Wall Street-Washington
Corridor”).
56. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12
U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. IV 2010).
57. See, e.g., KIMBERLY D. KRAWIEC, DON’T SCREW JOE THE PLUMMER: THE
SAUSAGE-MAKING OF FINANCIAL REFORM (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2445/
(showing
that
although the numerical quantity of comments by members of the general public
has been much greater, the depth of public comment by business interests is
much more substantive). See generally Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb
Yackee, A Bias Toward Business? Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68
J. POL. 128 (2006) (indicating that business input in the rulemaking process
tends to be more influential than that of private citizens, particularly where
expertise is required).
58. See, e.g., Bank Lobbying on Track to Reach Record High This Year:
Analysis, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2011/11/21/bank-lobbying-record-high_n_1106350.html (reporting on lobbying
outlays by financial institutions in 2011 for the purpose of resisting the rules
implementing Dodd-Frank).
59. The belief that government-sponsored banking is illegitimate is
reflected in at least three major strands of development in American financial
history: first, in the long running battle over whether to create a central bank
and the ensuing creation of the First and Second Banks of the United States;
second, in the repeated reversion by the states toward permitting “free
banking,” under which numerous private banks were permitted to operate
largely without restraint and which system was vigorously defended in the face
of the impending creation of a national banking system; and third, in the
curious structure of the federal reserve system, which continues to provide a
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always been critical for central banking and monetary policy
purposes, both of which are core to the operation of modern
government.60
Ironically, what was perceived as a mark of
sophistication in American banking—the dominance of “private”
banks—has obscured the critical “public” functions banks perform.61
Even before the creation of “central” banks, either in America or
Britain, bankers were critically important to government funding.
Indeed, the Bank of England was created in part with the support of
the goldsmiths of London to fend off robbing sovereigns, while also
enabling the sovereign to bypass Parliament when raising finance.62
The creation of both the First and Second Banks of the United
States, and even the subsequent establishment of a national
banking system, was accompanied by political controversy at the
level of the highest branches of government.63 Certainly the two
Banks of the United States and even the seemingly “private”
national banks were considered essential for the conduct of
government. The U.S. Supreme Court and various state courts
recognized the Banks of the United States to be instrumentalities of
government.64 National banks, chartered under the subsequent

major role for private banks in the operation of central banking functions.
There is a vast literature on these events and the accompanying, vigorous
political debates. See generally, e.g., DAVIS RICH DEWEY, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1903) (giving history prior to the creation of the
federal reserve system); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSEN SCHWARTZ, A
MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1857–1960 (1963) (outlining the
development of the modern federal reserve system).
60. On the evolving central bank functions of the Banks of the United
States and the national banking system, see, for example, RICHARD H.
TIMBERLAKE, MONETARY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTELLECTUAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 10–12 (1978) (explaining the functions of the First Bank
of the United States); id. at 30–33 (explaining the functions of the Second Bank
of the United States); id. at 160–164 (explaining the functions of national
banks).
61. See Baxter, supra note 15, at 818–25 (describing the various “quasipublic” functions banks perform).
62. See, e.g., 1 WALTER THORNBERRY, OLD AND NEW LONDON, ch. 40 (1878),
available at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=45058.
63. Of course this role has historically operated in tension with the other
prerogatives of legislatures and sovereigns. In Britain both Whigs and Tories
fiercely resisted the creation of the Bank of England in 1694. It was damned in
the usual manner of the times as yet another dastardly idea from Holland. Id.
So, too, was the resistance met by the idea of a Bank of the United States. The
history of the veto of the Second Bank by President Andrew Jackson in 1832, in
terms remarkably reminiscent of those uttered against the Old Lady of
Threadneedle Street herself, is well known. The story is once again retold in
his biography. See JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION: ANDREW JACKSON IN THE
WHITE HOUSE 208 (2008).
64. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 860 (1824)
(describing the Bank of the United States as “the great instrument by which the
fiscal operations of the government are effected”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
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National Currency Act of 186365 and the National Bank Act of
1864,66 were similarly recognized to enjoy the privileges of
government agencies.67
This quasi-governmental function and status has continued to
the modern day, blurring the divide between public and private—
between government and private industry—in ways that confuse
any simple analysis of either “capture” or “public interest.” It often
appears as if “capture” oscillates between government and the banks
in a mutually codependent relationship that is sometimes coercive,
sometimes supportive.
A.

Vehicles of Government Finance

The most visible role of banks as instrumentalities of
government has been to provide the financial means for government
to function. Governments have felt a compelling need for either
central banks or “private” banks (and, in practice, both) in order to
fund wars or other more peaceful enterprises. In the United States
the national banking system itself was created for two reasons: to
create a national system of legal tender and to provide a market and
mechanisms for raising public finance.68 As the federal government
found itself unable to fund itself effectively, and when the drains on
its coffers during the Civil War proved overwhelming, a compromise
in the form of the National Bank Act of 1864 led to the creation of a
federal chartering system for private “national” banks.69 Thus from
their inception, national banks had a public mission alongside their
private banking functions. Whereas they were restricted from the
outset in the degree to which they could invest in and underwrite
private debt, national banks have always been permitted, and even

U.S. 316, 354, 396, 422 (1819) (referring to the Bank as a “convenient, a useful,
and essential instrument in the prosecution of fiscal operations” and remarking
that “[it] is as much an instrument of the government for fiscal purposes, as the
courts are its instruments for judicial purposes”).
65. 12 Stat. 665, repealed by National Bank Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 99 (1864)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
66. 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
67. See National Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. 353, 361 (1869) (calling
national banks “the instrumentalities by which the government proposes to
effect its lawful purposes in the States”).
68. See generally BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM
THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR, ch. 22 (1957) [hereinafter HAMMOND,
BANKS]; BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE (1970) [hereinafter
HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY].
69. See HAMMOND, BANKS, supra note 68. The statute initially giving effect
to this system was the National Currency Act of 1863, which created the OCC
within the Treasury Department. This legislation was substantially amended
in 1864 by what came to be known as the National Bank Act, subsequently
codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.
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strongly encouraged, to invest in the debt of the U.S. government,
states, and their political subdivisions.70
And this role has continued to escalate to the present day. Now
the investment and dealing in government debt is a major
component of modern banking business; national banks and their
affiliates within complex holding company structures deal in
trillions of dollars of government debt.71 It is a role that has only
escalated as modern government deficit spending itself has
burgeoned. In 1991 total outstanding U.S. public debt stood at
under $4 trillion.72 This balance took nearly fifteen years to
double.73 In 2012, six years later, it has almost doubled again, and
outstanding debt is already nearly $16 trillion.74

70. The most important piece of financial regulation before Dodd-Frank,
namely the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, had established a separation of
investment and traditional or “commercial” banking by prohibiting banks from
investing and trading in securities on their own account. See The Banking Act
of 1933 §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (2006). Section 16
allowed for a most important exception: U.S. Government obligations,
obligations issued by government agencies, college and university dormitory
bonds, and the general obligations of states and political subdivisions. During
the 1990s, sovereign bonds were again given special treatment in that those
issued by OECD member countries have received zero-risk weightings—hence
requiring no capital charge—in assessing required minimums for bank risk
adjusted capital. Though clearly specious in light of numerous threats of
sovereign default, this policy certainly encourages banks to invest and deal in
sovereign debt. Most recently, the Volcker Rule specifically exempts U.S.
government debt from the prohibition against proprietary trading. See infra
note 89; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 619(d)(1)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2010) (adding § 13(d)(1)(A) to
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006)).
71. See Baxter, supra note 15, at 818–21 (citing more detailed statistics);
see also RICHARD BOVE, WHY DO BANKS NEED MORE CAPITAL? 16 (2012),
available
at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/events/2012
/bsc/bove_051012.pdf (citing the need for banks to act as primary dealers and
maintain liquidity in the Treasury markets as the major reason for protection of
the big banks).
72. Historical Debt Outstanding-Annual 1950-1999, TREASURYDIRECT (Aug.
18,
2008),
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt
_histo4.htm.
73. Historical Debt Outstanding-Annual 2000-2010, TREASURYDIRECT (Oct.
1,
2010),
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt
_histo5.htm.
74. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, MONTHLY STATEMENT OF THE PUBLIC DEBT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1 (2012), available at http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt
/reports/pd/mspd/2012/opds062012.pdf (reflecting an outstanding balance of
$15.85 trillion as of June 30, 2012).
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Conveyor Belts of Monetary Policy75

Closely related to their roles as market makers and investors in
government debt, banks—particularly national banks (which
comprise the overwhelming portion of the banking industry by
assets)—are instruments for applying monetary policy. They are, as
has famously been put, the “transmission belts” 76 by which the Fed
enlarges or contracts the money supply and stimulates or dampens
the economy, whether through setting overnight interbank lending
rates or buying securities from and selling them to banks.
It is of course true that other participants in the financial
services industry are also engaged in these roles, but here banks are
indeed “special.” In any event the other participants are tightly
interwoven with the banks, either as corporate affiliates or
counterparties. Like the tentacles of an octopus, banks form a
quasi-governmental web in the ocean of public finance.
C.

Bailout Agents of the Government

Two lesser-known “quasi-governmental” functions of banks are
just as important as those previously described. The first is that
they act as blotters on behalf of the government when other banks
fail. The second is that they are vehicles for the emergency
restoration of liquidity in the aftermath of a significant bank failure
or a widespread financial crash.
The first role is particularly true for very big banks: they are
most needed when other very large financial institutions fail and are
beyond the capacity of the government itself to resolve directly. In
such situations the government uses devices such as “purchase and
assumption” (“P&A”) transactions so that the net public outlay is
reduced as far as possible and disruptions to the economy are kept
to a minimum.77
The role of banks as bailout agents for the government is
particularly evident in the case of big banks. One will recall the
absorption by JPMorgan Chase & Co. of Bear Sterns and
Washington Mutual, the catastrophic acquisitions by Bank of
75. This imagery was used by E. Gerald Corrigan, then President of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, to illustrate an important quasigovernmental role played by banks, and one of such roles that differentiated
banks from other firms. See E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, FED.
RESERVE
BANK
MINN.
(1982),
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar
/ar1982a.cfm.
76. Id.
77. A P&A transaction is one in which another bank acquires the assets
(branches, etc.) of the failing bank and assumes some or all of its liabilities
(mostly to depositors). This saves the FDIC from having to make a net cash
outlay to depositors. On P&A transactions, see FDIC, RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK,
ch. 3 (2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook
/ch3pas.pdf.
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America Corp. of Countrywide and Merrill Lynch, and the snatching
by Wells Fargo and Co. of our venerable Wachovia from the jaws of
Citicorp at a frantic time when it was not always clear who was the
savior and who was being saved.78
In the process of these dramatic government-triaged
acquisitions, the big banks of course grew much bigger. Indeed,
even at a time when public objections to the size of our largest banks
had become central to the debate on financial regulatory policy, the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”),79 which had been
charged by Congress to conduct a study on whether the national
deposit and debt caps imposed on bank mergers were adequate,
concluded that banks should be exempted from these caps when
acquiring other distressed banks.80 This provides both a key to the
persistence of the “too-big-to-fail” phenomenon and an indication of
the national criticality, for good or ill, of the nation’s system of big
banks.81
The second role is much more subtle, and it is by no means
confined to large banks. When a bank fails, and particularly when a
series of banks fail, the economy served by that bank is placed under
immediate distress. Depositors do not have access to their savings,
and employers cannot meet their payrolls. Local and national
78. Among the many books describing these convoluted events, see
generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW
WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND
THEMSELVES (2009); DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON
THE GREAT PANIC (2009).
79. The FSOC was created by section 111 of the Dodd-Frank Act. DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321
(Supp. IV 2010).
80. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING CONCENTRATION LIMITS ON LARGE FINANCIAL COMPANIES 16 (2011).
81. In general, the banking industry is not very concentrated in the United
States. A recent analysis indicates that for the banking industry as a whole,
the four largest organizations (JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citicorp and
Wells Fargo) hold a total market share of about 35%. IBISWORLD, BANK ON IT:
AFTER A ROLLER COASTER RIDE, GOVERNMENT AID WILL REVIVE INDUSTRY
REVENUE 25 (2012). Partly as a result of their critical public service as bailout
agents, however, these banks have increased their concentration by almost 50%
since 2008 (23% to 34.2%). See id. at 21. The industry is highly concentrated in
certain areas. For example, the five largest banking organizations in the
United States own over 53% (in 1913 it was 6%) of all the banking assets, which
represent 57% of nominal GDP (2.6% in 1913), provide over 60% of all
mortgages, issue 62% of all credit cards, and control 95% of all corporate
lending. Heather Draper, Hoenig Targets Fed, Wall Street, Big Banks in Denver
Talk, DENVER BUS. J. (July 12, 2011), http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news
/2011/07/12/hoenig-targets-fed-wall-street-big.html?page=all; see also David J.
Lynch, Banks Seen Dangerous Defying Obama’s Too-Big-To-Fail Move,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-16
/obama-bid-to-end-too-big-to-fail-undercut-as-banks-grow.html (reporting on the
rapid recent growth of the large banks as a proportion of economic activity).
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economies instantly bear the impact of the failure because
depositors and employees are not able to pay their bills or continue
spending, and suppliers are, in turn, impacted.
In order to minimize these impacts, other banks must step in,
not only to act as bailout agents in the manner described above but
also to restore liquidity to local and national markets.82 While this
function has been well noted in the aftermath of the Crisis, as
attempts have been made to “get banks lending again,” it is often
assumed that such a role is confined to large banks. Indeed, it is
seldom remembered that the same role was considered important
for the creation of the federal deposit insurance system in 1933.83
And to this day the role of community banks as maintainers of
liquidity remains important.84
In light of these economically critical functions, it is obvious
that banks of all kinds play a quasi-governmental role that is
qualitatively different from that of other financial institutions85 and
industries.86
IV. VEHICLES FOR PROMOTING AND SUSTAINING
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The situation just described would seem at first blush to be
starkly antidemocratic. The lobbying power of big banks, their
powerful access to senior regulators, and their ongoing, codependent
82. See generally Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs,
Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 24 FED. RES. BANK MINN. Q. REV. 14 (2000)
(modeling the way in which deposit insurance offers a more efficient mechanism
for stabilizing local liquidity than exchange markets, which lead to runs on the
banks).
83. See 77 CONG. REC. 3840 (1933) (setting forth Representative Steagall’s
explanation that the billions of dollars banks would have loaned but for the fact
that they feared another bank run and therefore found it impossible to extend
credit).
84. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Community
Banking, Speech at the Independent Community Bankers of America National
Convention and Techworld, Nashville, Tenn. (Mar. 14, 2012), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120314a.htm
(explaining the important role of community banks in their local economies).
85. Note that this does not mean that banks are not tightly connected with
other financial institutions, which, indeed, underlines the dilemma of modern,
desegregated/post-Glass-Steagall banking.
86. See Corrigan, supra note 75 (continuing, rightly in the author’s view, to
hold the view that, enormous changes notwithstanding, banks are “special”
players in the economy); see also E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special? A
Revisitation,
FED.
RES.
BANK
MINN.
(Mar.
1,
2000),
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3527.
See generally Biagio Bossone, What Makes Banks Special? A Study of Banking,
Finance, and Economic Development (World Bank, Working Paper No. 2408,
1999) (supporting Corrigan’s position by arguing that the banking industry is
“special” and still distinct from its complementary nonbank financial partners).
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relationship with government all suggest the potential for, and
probability of, capture in the extreme. And this is not even to take
into consideration the enormous power of the government-sponsored
enterprises directly charged with implementing government housing
and education policy.
It is therefore not surprising that the accusation of “capture”
has been one of the most common charges leveled at banks,
politicians representing their interests, and senior officials,
particularly since the Crisis.87 Yet there are some mitigating
elements, including increased publicity requirements, a raised
public consciousness, and, perhaps least understood, the virtue of
America’s “hodgepodge” financial regulatory system. Furthermore,
it is important to consider the reality that a good deal of the
interaction between banks and the government is highly technical in
nature and necessarily so. This is not to excuse the lopsided nature
of political influence that banks often enjoy, but one must address
the different levels of interaction in order to start assessing whether
and when the overall public interest is being smothered because
regulators appear to be held captive by the industry.
A.

Expert v. Democratic Voices

When two very complicated elements of the Dodd-Frank reform
legislation were being translated into enforceable regulations,
namely the Volcker Rule88 and the new system for exchange-traded
derivatives,89 the level of ex parte access enjoyed by the banks
seemed astonishing. Numerous form comments were filed by
ordinary members of the public in the case of the Volcker Rule far
outnumbering the formal comments filed by the financial
institutions that were most likely to be affected. But the substance
of the industry comments was far more detailed. Logs of meetings
between representatives of the financial industry and regulators
appear to tell a similar story.90 In a similar vein, many of the senior
officials involved in implementing the reforms have been drawn
directly from the very industry that was the object of reform. Many
of these officials have since returned to the same industry.91

87. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 181–82.
88. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 619, 12
U.S.C. § 1851 (Supp. IV 2010) (explaining the details of the Volcker Rule, which
is the name given to section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, and adding a new
section 13 to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 that prohibits proprietary
trading by banks and their affiliates).
89. The Dodd-Frank Act added extensive provisions governing the
regulation of the derivatives business, a highly technical area of financial
services activity. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 711–774.
90. See, e.g., KRAWIEC, supra note 57, at 29–35.
91. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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Yet it seems unrealistic to expect a more “balanced” picture.
Regulating proprietary trading (Volcker Rule) and derivatives, or
bank capital structures,92 is an exceptionally technical matter.
While some public interest and consumer organizations might
possess sufficient expertise, the ability of the lay public to offer
meaningful input is likely to be very limited. Even financial
journalists often struggle to understand the issues and mechanisms
involved.
Complicating matters still further, financial regulation involves
the application of contested policies to these highly technical
fundamentals. While ex post empirical economic studies might
sometimes validate the effectiveness of certain policies, trying to
determine ex ante which policies should be applied, even when
complex technical issues are well understood, is inherently a matter
of ideology, narrative, and trope. The long-running battles between
Keynesians and Hayekians provide, of course, vivid examples.93 To
this extent, financial regulation, perhaps less than other regulatory
strategies addressing the natural environment,94 inevitably renders
policy formulation a political process that, in turn, not only requires

92. For example, the Collins Amendment to section 171 of the Dodd-Frank
Act extends minimum capital requirements to holding company structures. The
international Basel III standards add yet another complex dimension to such
requirements. See supra text accompanying note 47.
93. See generally NICHOLAS WAPSHOTT, KEYNES—HAYEK: THE CLASH THAT
DEFINED MODERN ECONOMICS (2011) (tracing the profound consequences for, and
differences in approach to, the role of government, including regulation, in the
economy, and the way in which Keynesian and Hayekian macroeconomics
defines many clashes over regulatory policy).
94. Environmental regulation might provide an example of more
scientifically verifiable policy results. When it comes to complex human system
failures, such as financial collapses, one only has to review the great classics on
the origins and causes of bank failures in the Great Depression to recognize
that in financial regulation we cannot agree even when presented with a
specific event, such as the Crash of 1929, to study. See generally GEORGE J.
BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING: THE
GLASS-STEAGALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED (1990); BEN S. BERNANKE,
ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION (2000); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON
SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960, ch. 7 (1963);
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 (reissue 1997). Similar
disagreement is to be found in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission set up
to examine the causes of the 2008 Crisis. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF
THE FIN. AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 3,
411, 441 (2011) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT] (containing a
majority report and two dissenting reports). In complex systems involving
multiple human agents, any efforts to rely on linear, reductionist causal
connections is bound to be incomplete and misleading. See generally George F.
R. Ellis, On the Nature of Causation in Complex Systems, 63 TRANS. ROYAL SOC.
SOUTH AFR. 69 (2008), available at http://www.mth.uct.ac.za/%7Eellis/Top
-down%20Ellis.pdf (exploring the multiple forms of causation operating in real
world systems).
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effective policy participation to be highly expert but also becomes
indeterminate in ways that encourage mutual suspicion between
contesting participants. It is this suspicion that can make capture
rhetoric so pernicious because capture offers a spuriously “scientific”
veneer to the analysis.
So it is in the world of complex financial regulation that our
democratic norms supporting public participation and our desire to
be sure that “technocrats” who really understand the industry they
are trying to regulate come into direct conflict. This does not mean
that public representation cannot be made independent of the
industry, which will naturally be looking out for its interests and not
those of a wider public, but it does mean that a substantial amount
of technical input will be necessary. This input is most likely to
derive from deep knowledge of the industry, and therefore to
emanate in practice from the industry itself. Indeed, in the case of
rapidly evolving modern financial markets it is hard to imagine
where else, other than very well-funded public interest groups,
academia, retired regulators, and members of the industry, such
input might come from.
B.

Traditional Balancing Mechanisms

To the extent that deep reliance on the industry is indispensible
to meaningful financial regulation, it would seem that industry
influence, though critical to realistic regulation, should be balanced
by other well-informed forces in order to prevent the influence from
becoming excessive to the point that it leads to regulatory outcomes
that ignore or prejudice competing public considerations. These
balancing forces take a variety of forms, each designed to provide an
offsetting mechanism. Some are very traditional, some are internal
to the regulatory process, and others are external checks and
balances. Some are still emerging. Some rely on regulatory
capability and expertise, others on objectivity, and others invoke
processes of participation in order to bring a variety of views to bear
in the deliberative process by which policy is decided. All have
received considerable attention in administrative law and will only
be summarized here.
1.

Adequate Regulatory Capacity

An emerging literature has drawn attention to the difficulties in
the United States, where regulators lack the status sometimes
enjoyed by their foreign counterparts and where regulator salaries
do not compete with those of their expert counterparts in the
financial markets.95 In addition, regulators are subject to the
95. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 4, at 194–96 (discussing the importance of
elevating the status and rewards of regulators).
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sometimes-whimsical budgetary and legislative mandates of
Congress. It is difficult for them to match the power and resources
of a well-funded array of industrial players, and it is difficult for
regulators to hold on to their best performers when these
individuals are faced with the temptations of private sector salaries
while having to meet high living expenses. When regulators are
given jurisdiction, it is simply not enough to provide them with legal
authority to act; they must also be able to discharge this legal
authority.96
2.

Meaningful Transparency

In financial services, regulators tend to have a penchant for
secrecy. Yet this opacity makes meaningful policy input difficult
unless one has inside access—a factor that often provides the basis
for accusations of capture.97 The Fed is particularly notorious for
avoiding publicity concerning its accusations and has had to be
forced, by Congress98 and through Freedom of Information Act
lawsuits,99 to divulge key information relating to its actions during
the Crisis. Yet it is a truism that transparency is a prerequisite not
only for the proper functioning of markets100 but also for the proper
96. See, e.g., JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., GUARDIANS OF FINANCE: MAKING
REGULATORS WORK FOR US 206–13 (2012) (discussing various elements of
regulatory capacity and vulnerability that must be addressed in order to ensure
effective implementation of regulation).
97. During the Crisis, the then-Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Paulson,
and the then-President of the New York Fed, Timothy Geithner, spoke
repeatedly to only a few of the industry titans. See, e.g., John Carney, Look
Who Really Controls Tim Geithner, BUS. INSIDER (Oct 8, 2009),
http://articles.businessinsider.com/2009-10-08/wall_street/29961329_1
_investment-banks-financial-firms-treasury-secretary-timothy-geithner
(reprinting an AP report, no longer available, revealing Geithner’s phone logs
during the Crisis); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Paulson’s Call Logs, ANDREW ROSS
SORKIN BLOG (Oct. 17, 2009), http://www.andrewrosssorkin.com/?p=88
(reproducing Paulson’s call logs during the September 2008 meltdown).
98. See Monthly Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance
Sheet, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov
/monetarypolicy/clbs-appendix-c-201204.htm (last updated May 3, 2012)
(describing the legislation and its application to fed disclosures). See generally
Nancy Watzman, Federal Reserve Forced to Report Which Banks Benefit from
Loan Programs, SUNLIGHT FOUND. REP. GROUP (Oct. 18, 2011),
http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2011/Federal_Reserve_forced_to_say/
(describing the legislative and judicial actions necessary to force Fed
disclosure).
99. See Bob Ivry, Revealing Fed’s Secrets Fails to Produce Harm that Banks
Cited, BLOOMBERG (Apr 2, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04
-02/revealing-fed-s-secrets-fails-to-produce-harm-that-banks-cited.html
(describing the FOIA lawsuits brought by Bloomberg and Fox News to force the
Fed to release information).
100. Pillar 3 of Basel II, which will operate alongside Basel III, is the
“Market Discipline” element of the international framework for financial
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formulation and application of public policy in regulations—as much
in financial regulation as anywhere else.101
3.

Meaningful Access by Stakeholders

The notice and comment model of administrative law is
designed to facilitate access by all interested parties to the policy
formulation process. As has already been noted, however, access
alone is not necessarily meaningful; the subject matter of financial
regulation tends to be intensely specialized and beyond the abilities
of ordinary members of the public. Therefore meaningful access
requires proponents of expert views, and this in turn introduces an
additional requirement for comment on technical financial
matters.102
4.

External Checks

These checks on the actions of regulators and policy outcomes
are traditional and include Congress, congressional committees,103
the Administration (including the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”)), the courts, inspectors general,104 and

regulation and its focus is on transparency as a means of promoting market
discipline. See Query for Pillar 3 Documents, BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/search/?q=Pillar+3&adv=1 (documents relating to Pillar 3);
supra note 47.
101. See generally Craig Holman & William Luneberg, Lobbying and
Transparency: A Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Reform, 1 INT. GRPS. &
ADV. 75 (2012), available at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/iga/journal/v1/n1
/pdf/iga20124a.pdf (discussing the criticality of transparency rather than mere
access, and making recommendations for enhancing transparency in the policy
making process).
102. For further review of the devices for making access more meaningful for
non-industry participants, see infra text accompanying notes 110–133.
103. Including such entities as the Government Accountability Office, which
produces numerous reports on financial regulation and its effectiveness, and the
U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which recently
produced a meticulously researched, three-volume report, PERMANENT
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:
ANATOMY
OF
A
FINANCIAL
COLLAPSE
(2011),
available
at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/senate
-investigations-subcommittee-releases-levin-coburn-report-on-the-financialcrisis.
104. The inspectors general of various financial regulatory agencies have
produced important reports concerning regulatory failure. See, e.g., U.S. SEC
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO
UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME (PUBLIC VERSION) (2009), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf; Welcome to SIGTARP,
SIGTARP, http://www.sigtarp.gov/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
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specially created oversight committees such as the Congressional
Oversight Panel105 and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.106
Rather than cover ground much more fully explored elsewhere,
this Article will conclude with a consideration of some recent ideas
and developments that are intended to create or develop institutions
designed to enhance and promote non-industry-sponsored
considerations of the public interest.
C.

Institutional Enhancement of Public Interest Representation

While it is true that technocratic regulation is not necessarily
captured regulation, and that divergent, multiple regulators help
generate the “democracy of ideas” so critical to balanced public
policy, it is also true that all of these interests are likely to be biased
in general toward the industry in one way or another. In other
words, the constant focus on the welfare of the industry, and the
perpetual interaction with the industry at various levels, is likely to
produce a distorted view of the overall interests of the public.
Taxpayers, for example, and laid off employees have borne the
biggest brunt of industry mistakes, yet those interests seldom figure
in any strong way when financial regulators make decisions. The
views of taxpayers and the general public are too dispersed to
receive adequate representation in agency decisions. They are a
stakeholder who is not at the table even when their interests are
likely to be genuinely affected.
The proposal of a public interest representative in such
decisions would no doubt provoke angry rejection by the financial
industry itself as yet another illegitimate intrusion by government
into the realm of free enterprise. In fact banking, and most of
financial services, is not “free enterprise.” On the contrary, it is a
heavily subsidized industry that carries out major quasigovernmental functions and is fully dependent on government
business and support for its current scale of operations. In the
author’s view this fact has been too often ignored or insufficiently
understood. Without taking this reality into account, the public will
always be short changed and the “public interest” that emerges from
the interaction of the regulators as earlier described will not likely

105. This panel was created to oversee the deployment of the TARP funds
committed by Congress to help remedy the economic collapse of the 2008 Crisis
(documents
now
archived
at
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop
/20110401223205/http:/www.cop.senate.gov/).
106. This bipartisan commission conducted hearings and researched the
causes of the Crisis. See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note
94. The Commission’s proceedings, documents, testimony, and report are now
archived at http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/.
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be sufficiently balanced to avoid the charge of “capture” by the
public at large.107
This would suggest the balance should be restored by
additional, more formal representation of the public interest. There
are various ways such “tripartism”108 might be enhanced.
1.

Formal Public Interest Representation

One way to intensify policy input from the “general public”—in
other words, views not specifically represented by a discreet
stakeholder—might be the introduction of formal mechanisms for
promoting representation of “public interests” through institutions
and procedural requirements. At least three examples have been
suggested.
One would be a mandated requirement for an
independent third-party opinion or brief in the administrative
process. Elsewhere I have raised the example of the MITRE
Corporation, which provides entirely independent, self-funding, and
expert consulting on government decisions affecting the public
interest yet besieged by strong commercial interests.109
The second method of promoting an independent view of the
public interest comes from public utility regulation110 and is
illustrated by the recent decision of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) involving the proposed acquisition by Duke
Energy of Progress Energy.111 The proposed merger had not yet
satisfied the concerns of the Commission about its possible
anticompetitive effects.112 The process for upholding public interest
107. See Baxter, supra note 15, at 825–31 (identifying the various forms of
public subsidy enjoyed by banks).
108. “Tripartism” has been defined as “regulatory policy that fosters the
participation of [public interest groups] in the regulatory process” in order to
promote fuller participatory democracy at the level of implementation of policy.
Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and
Empowerment, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 435, 441, 475 (1991); see also IAN AYRES
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE, ch. 3 (1992); Baxter, supra note 4, at 191–92.
109. Baxter, supra note 4, at 199.
110. A potential model for applying tripartism in financial services
regulation can perhaps also be found in insurance regulation, where some
states have developed proxy advocates for advocating the public interest in
regulatory proceedings. See Daniel Schwarcz, Preventing Capture Through
Consumer Empowerment Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation,
in PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND HOW
TO LIMIT IT (forthcoming 2012).
111. See Duke Energy Corporation and Progress Energy Inc., 137 FERC ¶
61,210
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files
/20111214190732-EC11-60-001.pdf (order rejecting compliance filing).
112. Id. at para. 90 (applying the statutory “public interest” standard to
reject the plans to mitigate adverse effects on competition of two energy
companies that are seeking approval to merge). Public utility regulation has a
long (and controversial) history of applying public interest standards, but these
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considerations is, as the Duke Energy decision illustrates, well
supported by the standing of numerous collectivities, such as local
authorities, who are properly organized to represent the general
interests of their taxpayers.113
A broad proposal along similar lines has been made by Ross
Levine, who advocates for—in terms of financial services
regulation—the creation of an agency or “Sentinel.”114 This agency
would have power to demand information, have expertise to
evaluate this information and the financial policies being adopted by
the agencies, and have the responsibility to report its views to
Congress and the executive branch.115 With purview over the whole
financial system, the Sentinel would bring a broader perspective to
bear than might otherwise be held by the specific agency whose
action is under review. Being independently funded and situated,
the Sentinel would also be in a position to offer impartial views as
between the various financial agencies.
Another such broad proposal, made by Saule Omarova, is a
“Public Interest Council” (“PIC”).116 The PIC would consist of an
expert independent government agency appointed by Congress and
located outside the executive branch, charged with participating in
the regulatory process as the designated representative of “the
public interest in preserving financial stability and minimizing
systemic risk.”117 Like the Sentinel, the PIC would possess neither
legislative nor executive powers; it would, however, have broad
authority to collect information from both government agencies and
private market participants, conduct investigations, publicize its
findings, and advise Congress and regulators to take action “with
respect to specific issues of public concern.”118
The difficulty with each of these ideas is that they are
predicated on a substantive “public interest” that can be identified
in some detached way by experts. Yet it is unlikely that any of the
agents in the process would acknowledge or even perceive that their
positions were not in fact the best ones for the public interest, and it
is has become naïve to expect otherwise. As one critic of the

are usually reinforced by statute and assisted through well organized public
and private representations (as was the case in the Duke Energy case).
113. See also Schwarcz, supra note 110, at 2.
114. This idea was first proposed by Ross Levine and is now incorporated
into a book he has coauthored. See BARTH ET AL., supra note 96, at 215–24; Ross
Levine, The Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the
Recent Crisis 2 (BIS, Working Papers No. 329, 2012).
115. Levine, supra note 114.
116. Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward
Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 658–59 (2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924546.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 623–24.
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Sentinel idea has put it, “[i]t is misleading to suggest that these
[regulatory] judgments do not have a strong political dimension to
them. They cannot be put on autopilot, or entrusted to a group of
disinterested ‘wise men.’”119 Proposing the addition of new layers to
the regulatory process is also a questionable strategy, politically and
financially. The regulators tend to be underresourced as it is, and
regulatory burden in financial services has become a rallying cry for
the industry, sometimes with good reason. Proposing to allocate
even more funds to yet more external public agencies would have
little prospect of success in today’s Congress.
2.

Private Public Interest Representation

A third option of expert representation by independent yet wellresourced private groups is now emerging in the field of financial
regulation. This is a cadre of privately funded and diverse expert
organizations akin to the “shadow banking committee” that played a
prominent role in critique of financial regulatory policy in the
United States in the ‘80s and ‘90s. The original shadow banking
committee is now known as the Shadow Financial Regulatory
Committee, an independent committee sponsored by the American
Enterprise Institute.120 Additional examples are the Brookings
Institution,121
Center
for
Economic
Policy
Research,122
123
124
PublicCitizen, new deal 2.0, Project on Government Oversight
(“POGO”),125 and Americans for Financial Reform.126
Similar
institutions are developing in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.127
Important academic centers are also providing growing and deeply

119. Howard Davies, Comments on Ross Levine’s Paper “The Governance of
Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent Crisis” 20 (Bank of Int’l
Settlements, Working Paper No. 329, 2010).
120. The Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee is sponsored by the
American Enterprise Institute. Special Topic: Shadow Financial Regulatory
Committee, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., http://www.aei.org/topic/shadow-financial
-regulatory-committee/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
121. BROOKINGS INST., http://www.brookings.edu/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
122. CENTER FOR ECON. POL’Y RES., http://www.cepr.net/ (last visited Sept. 5,
2012).
123. PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org (last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
124. New Deal 2.0, ROOSEVELT INST., http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/new
-deal-20 (last visited Sept. 2012).
125. POGO: PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, http://www.pogo.org/ (last visited
Sept. 5, 2012).
126. AM. FOR FIN. REFORM, http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/ (last visited Sept.
5, 2012).
127. Such developments are described in a forthcoming chapter by Christine
Farnish, chair of Consumer Focus in the United Kingdom. See INT’L CTR. FOR
FIN. REG., REGULATORY CAPTURE: THE OPTIMAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
REGULATOR AND THE REGULATED (working title, forthcoming Sept. 2012).
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informed input to the public policy process,128 and financial
regulators are beginning to take advantage of seemingly
independent advisory boards.129
Perhaps the most prominent and potentially influential
example of independent expert public interest representation is the
new “Systemic Risk Council,” recently formed by Sheila Bair, former
chair of the FDIC, with support and sponsorship from the Chartered
Financial Analyst (“CFA”) Institute and the Pew Charitable
Trusts.130 The Council will comprise some of the leading and most
senior former regulators,131 at least two of whom took
extraordinarily independent lines even while in government
office.132
Bodies like these are independent of the industry itself and
presumably reflect independent perspectives, accumulating
financial expertise, and the potential for much needed expert input
and balance on the complicated issues of financial regulation.

128. See, e.g., The Volatility Institute, NYU STERN SCH. BUS.,
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/experience-stern/about/departments-centers
-initiatives/centers-of-research/volatility-institute/index.htm (last visited Sept.
5, 2012); see also INET@Oxford, INST. FOR NEW ECON. THINKING,
http://ineteconomics.org/initiatives/partnerships/oxford (last visited Sept. 5,
2012) (bringing together in a recently established institute various disciplines,
including complexity science, to analyze issues such as systemic risk and
financial crises).
129. See, e.g., FDIC Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee, FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/srac/index.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2012)
(revealing a recently established committee, which has as its members some
independent experts who have been highly critical of regulatory policy).
130. See Former FDIC Chair to Lead Systemic Risk Council, Monitor
Financial Regulation, BUS. WIRE (June 6, 2012), http://www.businesswire.com
/news/home/20120606005519/en/FDIC-Chair-Lead-Systemic-Risk-Council
-Monitor [hereinafter Former FDIC Chair]; Sheila Bair to Lead Private
Financial Risk Council, REUTERS (June 6, 2012), http://www.reuters.com
/article/2012/06/06/financial-regulation-bair-idUSL1E8H66DN20120606; Sheila
Bair: From Regulator to Watchdog, FRONTLINE (June 12, 2012),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial
-crisis/money-power-wall-street/sheila-bair-from-regulator-to-watchdog/.
131. The Council will be Paul Volcker, former chairman of the Fed, and
several former financial agency chairs. For the full list, see Former FDIC
Chair, supra note 130.
132. Sheila Bair herself exhibited fierce independence as chairman of the
FDIC, and Brooksley Born, former chair of the CFTC, attempted herself to
impose regulation on financial derivatives in the face of fierce industry and,
ultimately, Congressional opposition. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, The Contrarian:
Sheila Bair and the White House Financial Debate, NEW YORKER (July 6, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/07/06/090706fa_fact_lizza (providing
a profile on Sheila Bair after her Profile in Courage award for her independent
line on financial regulation); Brooksley Born, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/Brooksley_Born (last visited Sept. 5, 2012) (providing a profile on
Brooksley Born, also a Profile in Courage award recipient).
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CONCLUSION
Despite appearances, it is too facile to assert that financial
agencies are simply “captured.” To be sure, the great power of large
financial institutions strongly suggests that their interests will
receive considerable attention—perhaps even unduly special
consideration—and that they are sometimes inappropriately
favored. Yet, given the nature of the financial system and its
operations, it is hard to envisage a more active interplay than the
one between government and big banking. The implicit safeguard of
the complex regulatory matrix, however, can operate as a brake on
the inclinations of one particular agency to lean too far in the
direction of a favored sector of the industry. At the same time, we
are also seeing the growing organization and capability of powerful
private groups that are providing expert voices to the policy
formulation process. While it is difficult to sustain the argument for
a single “public interest” representative, the growing number of
organized, “public interest” oriented and independent participants
offers the promise of an important counterbalance to the influence of
industry.
It is possible that the complicating considerations reviewed in
this Article—matrixed regulation and multiple layers of regulators,
on the one hand, and a blurred division between government and
private market functions on the other—are entirely unique to the
financial industry. Yet it seems that some similarities in other
regulated industries might also suggest that the charge of “capture”
should often be taken with the proverbial pinch of salt, or at least
with a healthy dose of detailed understanding of the complexities of
the regulatory field under discussion. Such an approach might not
win a Nobel Prize, but it will be grounded in greater reality.

